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INTRODUCTION 
Intelligence is like witchcraft; you have to be accepted by the com-
munity in order to practise it.1 No amount of wishful thinking will gain 
you entry to the trade. Doors are opened only after the prospective en-
trant has demonstrated that he has something to offer the community 
and this was Canada's experience with the Allied intelligence network 
during World War II. 
As a member of the British Commonwealth, Canada received the 
regular reports of the British Foreign Office through the Dominions Of-
fice. It also had its own small network of posts abroad.2 From neither 
source did it receive information acquired through allied intelligence 
which meant Canada entered the war without being privy to these 
secrets. At the outset of the war, censorship of all mail, and especially 
that going to and from internees in Canada, provided some contact with 
British intelligence officers. Such information was, however, generally of 
more use in psychological warfare than operational intelligence because 
of the slowness with which it was processed. The monitoring of uncoded 
messages being sent to enemy embassies and consulates in Canada pro-
vided additional information but these intercepts were not important 
enough to justify a Canadian request for access to high-level allied in-
telligence networks. 
The only other asset that Canada had to offer the intelligence com-
munity was its contribution to the interception of enemy wireless 
telegraphy. Since 192S there had been a wireless intercept station at Es-
quimau but this was really a British Admiralty operation for which 
Canada merely provided the real estate. Canadian scientists at the Na-
tional Research Council had also made an important contribution to the 
technical aspects of this work by demonstrating to the British that the 
cathode ray tube could be used as a visual indicator for determining the 
direction finding bearings of enemy ships. Important as this discovery 
was, it did not bring Canada into the intelligence network. 
Two consequences resulting from the fall of France in 1940 suddenly 
made Canada a more valuable ally, for Britian now needed Canada first 
as a base for recruiting and training new intelligence agents and second 
for monitoring Vichy's wireless telegraphy. In the spring and summer of 
1940 conventional armed resistance in Western Europe was collapsing 
under the onslaught of the Nazi juggernaut. With Hitler's capture of 
Paris, the British Secret Intelligence Service lost, almost overnight, its 
professional European agents and, after the withdrawal at Dunkirk, 
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there was no longer direct means for assisting British collaborators 
behind enemy lines. To continue the fight, the British desperately needed 
material assistance from North America and assurance that South 
America would not fall victim to Nazi propaganda or subversion.3 
DEVELOPING BRITISH SECURITY COORDINATION 
In those dark days when Hitler was amassing his forces for a strike 
across the English Channel, Churchill appointed a tough and experienc-
ed Canadian, World War I veteran William Stephenson, to establish 
what later became known as British Security Coordination (BSC),4 head-
quartered in New York City. Although this location had the advantage 
of being at the hub of the free world's commercial and communications 
centre, it was also in a neutral country. United States' neutrality entailed 
a ban on having its citizens working for belligerents in a foreign war. 
Stephenson, who needed a safe and disguisable boot camp for gathering 
together prospective BSC subversive agents, had to turn back toward 
Canada. Stephenson's initial contact in Ottawa came through a Montreal 
businessman, Charles Vining, who was soon to head the Wartime Infor-
mation Board.5 At that time, however, he was working for Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King studying methods of developing a sympathetic 
public appreciation in the United States, of Allied, and more particularly 
Canadian, war efforts. Vining feared that the ever-cautious King would 
either reject outright the BSC proposal for a transit camp in Canada or 
hamstring its operations by government controls. Accordingly it was to 
Colonel Ralston, the Minister of National Defence, that the idea of a 
camp was first presented. Ralston agreed with Vining's assessment of the 
Prime Minister and undertook personal responsibility for the BSC base 
in Canada should any difficulty or publicity surface. 
Because BSC was a civilian organization Ralston chose to make Ex-
ternal Affairs, rather than his own military intelligence units, its point of 
contact in Canada. Within External Affairs Norman Robertson6 was 
chosen as the liaison person with BSC. Robertson was an obvious choice 
because of his extensive work with enemy aliens, earning him the 
somewhat exaggerated title of "Departmental secret-service operative."7 
Contact with Robertson was made through a Toronto stock broker, 
Stephenson's trusted agent in Canada, Tommy Drew-Book. Robertson 
found the proposal for a safe boot camp for training allied saboteurs and 
subversive agents a little venturesome and hesitated to approve such an 
open-ended operation. For one thing, the RCMP would have to be con-
sulted and he was worried about how to handle trainees in civilian life 
after the war. As Robertson realized only too well, some of the skills re-
quired of BSC collaborators were likely to be of use in peacetime in il-
legal or covert activities. How Robertson's initial suspicions were over-
come is not known but within a few days approval was given and in an 
incredibly short time land was made available near Oshawa through the 
efforts of George Drew, the Leader of the Conservative Opposition in 
Ontario. In the autumn of 1940 the Country House, or Camp X as it has 
now become known, became operative. The Country Home was essen-
tially a British operation, supplied and guarded by the Canadian army.8 
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After the installation of Hydra9 to link it up with British secret in-
telligence operations around the world, it was camouflaged as an opera-
tion of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 
Few Canadians knew what was going on inside the Country House. 
The main operational tie with the Canadian Government was initially 
through Robertson but, after he became Under-Secretary of State for 
External Affairs in February 1941, it was transferred to Tommy Stone. 
Stone was External Affairs' colorful expert on economic warfare and 
censorship.10 He was instantly at home in Stephenson's world of intrigue. 
Stone put into action the plans for acquiring the information, personnel, 
and materials that BSC needed and used his considerable ingenuity to ob-
tain such things as an Italian typewriter with distinctive keys or a 
Spanish-speaking Canadian newspaperman who, because of his ex-
perience, could act as a BSC reporting agent in Latin America. Stone 
also coordinated assistance from the RCMP and National Defence in ac-
quiring yellow-fever serum, in instructing customs and immigration of-
ficials to overlook certain irregularities in trans-border shipments, in 
buying clothes that had authentic European labels from Canadians who 
had recently been abroad, and in producing materials for forged letters." 
The execution of these plans involved hundreds of Canadians who loyal-
ly supplied and worked on fabrications and forgeries without ever know-
ing their end-use. Sufficient was the knowledge that they were needed for 
the war. Although he headed Stone's department, the Prime Minister 
chose to know as little as possible about these activities,12 yet the conduct 
of these activities made Robertson one of Stephenson's trusted advisers, 
and helped Canada become a part of the intelligence community. Once 
Ottawa acquired the necessary telecrypton machinery Robertson and 
Stephenson were in almost daily contact with each other. 
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND CRYPTOGRAPHY 
The BSC connection was not the only link which Canadians were 
developing with allied intelligence operations. Quite independent of this 
link, Canadian naval intelligence officers were making progess in their 
studies of German naval telecommunications. Devastating losses of 
allied shipping to German submarine attacks made their work im-
perative. So, too, did the collapse of France, as the British Admiralty re-
quested the navy to monitor French naval frequencies in the hope of 
discovering what was to happen to the French Fleet.13 By February 1941 
the Canadian Navy was able to issue its first intelligence summary. When 
the Germans bombed the British Admiralty, Canadian naval head-
quarters quickly expanded its work into a full-scale Operational In-
telligence Center. The army, air force and the Radio Division of the 
Department of Transport were also using their receivers to provide the 
British with information for operational intelligence. Such information 
played an important part in mounting the successful attack on 
Germany's giant battleship, the Bismarck, and as the British High Com-
missioner told Norman Robertson, their "efficiency in intercepting 
enemy secret service wireless telegraph traffic is well known and is most 
highly valued."14 Nevertheless, most of this was just transmittal work for 
7 
Fall 1984 
the British who produced the real intelligence reports. For Canada to 
produce its own studies a cryptographic facility would be required. 
In November 1940 the Chief Signal Officer of the United States Ar-
my strongly recommended to Captain Drake of the Royal Canadian 
Corps of Signals that no time should be lost in developing a cryp-
tographic bureau in Canada.15 The Corps was intrigued by the possible 
uses of information obtained through such an operation, particularly for 
combating the growing German U-boat menace in the North Atlantic. 
The Corps' proposal for a two hundred member cryptographic branch 
was considered too costly by the Canadian Joint Chiefs of Staff to be im-
plemented immediately. Instead, British facilities were deemed adequate 
and, should they be interfered with, it was reasoned that Canadians 
could always use American facilities.16 In the meantime, information be-
ing gathered by coastal wireless intercepting stations would simply be 
relayed to the grateful British for cryptanalysis. 
Not willing to accept this rebuff, Drake put the idea of a Canadian 
cryptographic unit to Stone, reasoning that External Affairs would have 
to be involved if diplomatic codes were eventually to be broken. Stone 
was keen and so was Robertson who, from the normal postal intercepts 
that he had seen in connection with the activities of enemy aliens, was 
fully aware of the gaps in intelligence gathering operations. Because 
American officials advised against fostering inter-service rivalry by hav-
ing such an operation linked too closely with any particular branch, 
Robertson suggested that it be housed with the National Research Coun-
cil.17 This move would be more practical, too, from the point of view of 
secrecy. First, the Council's acting President was already aware of the in-
terception work through the Council's scientific experiments, but, of 
greater significance, such work would be less conspicuous under the 
auspices of the Council since its personnel would not come under the 
open hiring procedures of the Civil Service Commission. 
Contacts of the acting chief of the Council led to an invitation being 
issued in April 1941 to University of Toronto Professor Gilbert Robin-
son, to consider what might be done in the field of cryptanalysis. Robin-
son was a brilliant mathematician but he had no experience in cryp-
tanalysis, nor had any other Canadian. Having sought the advice of a 
university colleague who had some contacts in Washington, Robinson 
and he set off in search of know-how. Their original Washington contact 
suggested that they enlist Herbert Osborne Yardley, a recognized expert 
from the defunct American Cryptographic Bureau and something of a 
buccaneer, who lacked discretion and tact. After receiving the 
Distinguished Service Medal for his work, Yardley had become 
disgruntled over the President Hoover's refusal to sanction eavesdropp-
ing on the messages of other nations and broke all rules of the trade by 
publishing "The American Black Chamber," an account of how the 
MI-8 operation worked before its demise in 1929.18 Nevertheless, Yardley 
did know how the intelligence community worked and, because he was 
one of the world's leading cryptographers, Ottawa scooped him up. 
Mindful of Yardley's past indiscretions, however, it was decided that 
8 
Conflict Quarterly 
while in Canada he would be 'undercover,' rather weakly disguised as 
Herbert Osborne. 
In June 1941 a Canadian cryptanalysis operation came together in 
what was called the Examination Unit of the National Research Council. 
It was located in the sprawling house next to the prime minister's 
residence on Laurier Avenue, where additional security precautions 
would not seem out of place. Stone was made chairman of an in-
terdepartmental committee which would oversee the Examination Unit's 
operations and assist Robinson in recruiting Canadian staff. Staff needs 
were determined by the codes to be worked on. The sophisticated 
military ones, that later caught people's attention as "Enigma," "Ultra" 
and "Purple," were ruled out because the Canadians had no cyphering 
or decyphering machines and even the expert, Yardley, was not qualified 
to use them. Moreover, the only Canadian source of intelligence initially 
available were the encyphered diplomatic cables that came to and from 
foreign missions and consuls in Ottawa and what messages could be pick-
ed up by the newly installed wireless receiver of the Signals Corps in Ot-
tawa. Entry into the wider network of intelligence-gathering would re-
quire the cooperation of William Stephenson. But what could the fledgl-
ing Examination Unit do for BSC in return? 
Because BSC was initially intent on completing its identification of 
German agents and U-boats operating in Latin America and Ottawa's 
wireless interception facilities happened to be in one of the best locations 
for picking up messages to Latin America, Stone was hopeful that a 
mutually beneficial arrangement would evolve.19 The problem was that 
the job of monitoring German agents in Latin America was scheduled to 
pass from Britain to the United States, and that meant that good Cana-
dian facilities would become redundant. To prevent this, Stephenson 
persuaded Stone and Robertson that the Examination Unit should in-
stead begin to work on Vichy's diplomatic communications, for which 
Canadians possessed the requisite linguistic skills. 
THE EXAMINATION UNIT AND VICHY 
The Vichy assignment appealed to both Stone and Robertson who 
believed that the magnitude of Canada's contribution to British survival 
was dependent to a large extent on the fate of France. The northern half 
of France was securely in the hands of the Germans while Vichy, the 
unoccupied southern half, appeared amenable to collaboration with the 
Nazis. Vital to national unity and to the Canadian war effort was the 
question of whether the Province of Quebec would rally behind the rem-
nant of Free French in London or side with the Vichy Government. For 
those French-Canadians who disdained Canadian participation in what 
they chose to regard as Britain's imperialistic struggle, Vichy's stand was 
commendable.20 If that attitude became too prevalent, however, a strong 
and possibly violent back-lash could be expected from bitter anti-Vichy 
Canadians who wanted France revived to fight and to be returned to 
French control. 
External Affairs was weighing these factors in relation to General 
Vanier, Canada's Minister to France who had, by this time, removed to 
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London. If he were to return to France there were bound to be protests 
on the domestic front. The Free French presence in London as an alter-
native French Government made it impossible for the British to remain 
on good terms with Vichy, even if they had so wished. Yet, the British 
did want to keep a close eye on Vichy, as did the United States, because 
of a concern about the disposition of the French fleet and colonies. Thus, 
domestic and international circumstances led Canada into a compromise 
whereby Vanier would retain his title but return home, while his deputy, 
Pierre Dupuy, would reside in London as chargé d'affaires in between 
visits to Vichy. This, in turn, would leave Vichy free to retain its legation 
in Ottawa, the purpose of the whole maneuver. Despite the expected 
public back-lash against a pro-fascist Vichy representative in Ottawa, it 
was important that the legation remain open if the Examination Unit was 
to have sufficient communications to intercept. 
During the summer and autumn of 1941 the Examination Unit grew 
rapidly to a staff of twenty-five. Robinson had brought in some of the 
his associates from the mathematics and French departments at the 
University of Toronto. Ironically French-Canadians were not originally 
employed because someone had doubted their allegiance. All those 
handling the French traffic had English as a mother tongue until the 
summer of 1942 when the policy was relaxed and Stone used a contact in 
censorship to recruit French-Canadians. 
The Examination Unit, however, had a much more fundamental 
problem. Some success in decyphering messages had been realized as ear-
ly as October 1941 but Robertson advised King that better access to traf-
fic and allied code-breaking information was needed if the Unit was to 
become really effective.21 Yardley had not been as useful as had been ex-
pected and Robinson, who had been working largely on his own, had 
gone about as far as he could in trying to decypher Vichy messages. 
Thanks to some basic training in Washington and to his innate 
mathematical wizardry, the simple diplomatic codes used by the Vichy 
Minister in Ottawa had been broken, but there was no way of making 
sense out of communications in cypher without knowing the words to 
substitute from the Vichy code books. A list of the words to be 
substituted could be built up but it would require years of painstaking 
analysis of thousands of messages. Help from the British and Americans, 
who had advanced further in developing their versions of Vichy code 
books, was sought but denied. This was the state of affairs in the Ex-
amination Unit when the question of the future of St. Pierre and Mi-
quelon arose in the autumn of 1941.22 
At various times the British had pushed for a Free French take-over 
of the two islands off the coast of Newfoundland although the United 
States wanted nothing of the sort for fear that such an action would pro-
voke problems in the French West Indies. The necessity for allied agree-
ment on the fate of the islands was confirmed by an RCMP report of a 
powerful radio transmitter on St. Pierre which, in the wrong hands, 
could give Vichy and the Germans valuable information pertaining to 
allied convoys moving into the North Atlantic. On Robertson's instruc-
tions the navy had already seized a French fishing vessel with wireless 
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telegraphy equipment used to transmit the whereabouts of British ships 
to the Germans. King seemed reluctant to antagonize either the British or 
the Americans; he was surprised therefore when, without prior discus-
sion with himself, Robertson submitted a scheme of Tommy Stone's for 
Cabinet War Committee approval. The plan called for sending a Cana-
dian corvette to seize the wireless station and Stone's "putsch," as it was 
known, gained support in the Cabinet War Committee before King 
aborted it by vetoing the use of a corvette. 
For Robertson, the risks of leaving the station in Vichy hands seem-
ed far greater than King's concern that a Canadian seizure would serve as 
a pretext for German reactions elsewhere.23 If only the Examination Unit 
could provide information that would verify reports from Stone and a 
Free French agent in Canada, Elisabeth de Miribel, regarding Vichy's 
true intentions, then the stubborn King might revoke his veto of Stone's 
mission. Robinson and his colleagues were instructed to work all the 
more feverishly but to no avail. The Vichy cypher eluded them as they 
puzzled over the two or three long telegrams that the Vichy minister 
received each day.24 Nor were they able to get any clues from other Vichy 
messages being picked up by the Department of Transport's station in 
Forest (later Winnipeg), Manitoba.25 External Affairs tried to persuade 
American officials that closer cooperation with the Examination Unit 
could be beneficial to both countries but they were told that this could 
not happen as long as Yardley remained in charge. They had never 
forgiven him for his earlier indiscretion and to make matters worse, it 
was now rumored that he had been contacted by a German agent. Clear-
ly, Yardley would have to go if the work was to advance further. 
Fortunately for the Examination Unit, the British were willing to 
send a competent replacement though they had their own reasons for 
wanting to develop Canadian capabilities. Once the United States had 
entered the war, the British had begun looking for means of dividing 
work on intercepts by region. It was geographically impossible to in-
tercept trans-Pacific traffic from the United Kingdom and it was taking 
too long to transmit to London all the direction finding bearings and 
wireless telegraph inferences from Canada's west coast stations. With 
Japan in the war, the entire Pacific Ocean needed to be covered and the 
British had neither the trained personnel nor the equipment for such an 
undertaking. The request for Canadian assistance came with the promise 
that "any help which the United Kingdom authorities can give in regard 
to Japanese technique or other matters is at the disposal of the Canadian 
authorities."26 For the Examination Unit, this help came in the person of 
Colonel Strachey who replaced Yardley in January 1942. 
Both British and United States cryptographers now shared their keys 
to Vichy codes as well as copies of intercepts that BSC had obtained from 
their receiving stations. Soon after Strachey's arrival, came the big 
breakthrough as BSC acquired actual copies of the Vichy code books and 
passed them on to the Examination Unit. The Unit could now perform a 
more worthwhile service in identifying important intercepts that would 
assist the Allied planning for the invasion of North Africa in November 
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1942. Reports from the Examination Unit further ensured that Ottawa 
was somewhat better informed about what the enemy was doing. 
As Strachey was getting the Vichy traffic organized, there was a 
pressing need for getting further into Japanese interception. The Cana-
dian navy had developed some expertise in this area and with allied 
assistance the Examination Unit was able to read low level Japanese 
codes by November 1941. Further, through the Point Grey, British Col-
umbia, station operated by the Department of Transport. Canada had 
the capacity to receive important diplomatic traffic that could not be 
picked up in other parts of the British Empire. 
As the Examination Unit expanded its work there was increasing 
concern over the duplication of effort, not only among the armed forces 
but also among the allies, with the fear that too little was actually being 
accomplished. With the American entry in the war, the British had felt a 
need for the rationalizing and coordinating of allied efforts. Early in 
1942 they offered to help the Canadians coordinate Canadian in-
telligence work under a national "Y" Committee similar to their own 
operation. The great advantage of the British "Y" organization was that 
it linked the armed forces operations together with those of the Foreign 
Office and the Radio Security Service in order to avoid duplication and 
to meet the requirements of the approximately two thousand British 
cryptanalysts. On Britain's suggestion, in April 1942 the United States-
British Radio Intelligence Conference met to assign frequencies and ar-
range for the exchange of naval, military, air, diplomatic and commer-
cial wireless intercepts to the mutual benefit of the national "Y" 
organizations that the British were urging both Canada and the United 
States to adopt. 
The Canadian delegates to the Washington conference were so im-
pressed by the British proposal that before the British "Y" mission 
under Captain H.R. Sandwith had reported on his study of Canadian 
operations, a Canadian Y Committee composed of army, navy, air force 
and External Affairs representatives had been established to report to the 
Chief of Staff. It met regularly from May 5,1942 onward and divided its 
work between a technical sub-committee and an Operational Y Commit-
tee under Stone's direction. It was this Y committee that provided the im-
petus to implement Sandwith's recommendations for more equipment 
and personnel, and for greater distinction in the roles of the various ser-
vice operations.27 As a result, the army's Discrimination Unit28 which 
distinguished significant from insignificant messages was moved into the 
same building as similar units from the navy and air force. The Foreign 
Intelligence Section of the Canadian navy, which was working on low-
grade Japanese traffic, was transferred to the Examination Unit. The 
Signals Corps was given permission to upgrade its interception facilities 
so as to take over all diplomatic frequencies. Henceforth all messages 
received from the nineteen Canadian receiving stations were channelled 
to the Examination Unit. 
It was one thing to learn more about the enemy's activities, it was 
quite another to make effective use of this information. For External Af-
fairs the main task was to devise some means of utilizing political and 
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long-range intelligence. Previously, when intelligence and security mat-
ters had surfaced from time to time at External Affairs, they had been 
surveyed by Robertson and dealt with by Stone. But Stone did not have 
time to keep adequate control of operations, and raw intelligence coming 
from the Examination Unit was placed in a broad context where its 
significance could be appreciated in making foreign policy decisions. Ex-
ternal Affairs needed analyzed, rather than raw, intelligence which might 
be integrated with that coming from other sources. 
As a result of an investigation of this dilemma by George 
Glazebrook,29 a special wartime assistant loaned to the Department by 
the University of Toronto, and through the urgings of Stephenson, a 
Special Intelligence Section of External Affairs was formed within the 
Examination Unit in September 1942. The new section's mandate was to 
prepare, from the Examination Unit's material and other sources, in-
telligence reports on Japan and the Far East.30 The section's first assign-
ment was to summarize and digest the information being churned out by 
the Examination Unit, then determine what was of sufficient political 
importance to justify the production of an analytical and interpretative 
report.31 Robertson also hoped that members of the section would 
develop an expertise which would enable the department to refer ques-
tions to them that would otherwise require considerable research. Before 
long, the Special Intelligence Section was being given specific research 
topics, such as, the possible effect of the acquisition by Germany of 
Spanish wolfram for use in hardening steel. Both External Affairs and 
British Security Coordination assigned projects to the section. The main 
limitation on its work was that of size since it never had more than two 
officers and three support staff. Throughout its operation it was headed 
by Herbert Norman,32 an obvious choice because of his scholarly in-
stincts, and the department's expert on Japanese affairs. His assistant 
handled the French and Spanish language portions of the work and other 
unrelated subjects. 
Stone hoped that by making the work of the Special Intelligence Sec-
tion available, Canada would come to share in the secrets of allied in-
telligence from which it had been hitherto excluded. Because of the 
secure communications link with New York and Washington an ex-
change of intelligence reports did take place but the flow seemed largely 
in one direction. In part this was a matter of size since the total Canadian 
operation was miniscule in comparison to the British. The Examination 
Unit had neither the experienced staff nor the machines needed to get in-
to more sophisticated work, even if Canada's allies had been agreeable 
which they were not. 
Precisely how important the section's work was is difficult to 
measure since other considerations were weighed along with the reports 
themselves when it came to making decisions. It certainly gave officials a 
wider perspective on international events than they could otherwise have 
acquired and advance insight on positions to be taken at important 
gatherings. Through this channel, for example, Ottawa was forewarned 
of positions to be taken at the Yalta meeting and the San Francisco 
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Conference that gave birth to the United Nations.33 It was also better 
able to understand the differences between the British and French posi-
tions on the Middle East. 
At a time when it was difficult to assess the impact the war was hav-
ing on morale in Japan, the section did provide External Affairs with 
useful studies based on the unit's decyphering of intercepts of Japanese 
diplomatic traffic to small countries. Because of his recognized skills in 
the language and his knowledge of Japanese history and philosophy, 
Norman was accepted by British and American officials who allowed 
him to check his political analyses against their own. Colonel William 
Donovan's American Office of Strategic Services was an avid consumer 
of Norman's work. The Canadian services, as well, were guided by his 
analysis in making their assessments, and these became vital in 1943 
when Japan was in the ascendancy in the Pacific. Through these reports 
Norman was able to direct Canadian thinking on post-war Japan and he 
would later be charged with translating this into policy.34 
The single most important message that the unit worked on during 
the war was the Vichy signal to Admiral Robert to scuttle the French fleet 
lying at anchor off the Caribbean island of Martinique. The presence of 
French facilities and equipment in the Caribbean became a vital factor in 
the struggle against German submarine activities in 1942. A German sub-
marine had visited Martinique in February. In May the United States 
demanded that Robert's ships be totally immobilized by the removal of 
all ordnance. In addition all merchant ships and gold that had been 
transferred to Martinique were to be turned over to the allies. In return 
for these concessions the United States would recognize Robert as the 
ultimate governing authority of Martinique and other French posses-
sions. To prevent this arrangement from coming to pass the Germans 
persuaded Vichy Prime Minister Pierre Laval to scuttle immediately the 
French fleet and it was the Ottawa intercepting station that picked up 
Laval's orders. Once decyphered and decoded by the Examination Unit 
the message was given to Robertson who alerted the Americans. In the 
end, no intervention was required as Robert refused to carry out Laval's 
orders. 
It is of note that this interception occurred at the very time when 
King was under intense public pressure to expel the Vichy Minister from 
Canada. The main reason for not doing so was contained in a memoran-
dum from Robertson: "Vichy is a listening post where military as well as 
political information can be obtained on France and the whole of 
Europe. It is impossible for the United States Embassy in Vichy, or their 
Consulates in the unoccupied zone to obtain all the information 
available."35 This reason overshadowed the need to protest against 
Laval, to maintain unity among Commonwealth members and to satisfy 
public opinion in Canada. Thus the Vichy Minister would be allowed to 
remain in Ottawa until November 9,1942 when the political necessity for 
breaking off relations became overwhelming. There was no doubt that in 
this instance, and others, the Examination Unit had made at least a 
minor contribution to allied intelligence. It also justified the Examina-
tion Unit's continuance of work on French traffic until July 1945.36 
14 
Conflict Quarterly 
Information from the Special Intelligence Section played a role in 
opening up a new activity for the Canadian Government. Official United 
States dislike of all things associated with de Gaulle was well known and 
when Stone saw de Gaulle's plans for post-war administration, he realiz-
ed there was bound to be trouble. Stone and Glazebrook hoped to lessen 
the potential for friction between France and the United States by having 
Canadians ready to assist the French in civil administration when the 
Nazis withdrew. The two persuaded the military to set up a Canadian 
Civil Administration Staff Course at the Royal Military College in 
Kingston. Glazebrook designed the course of study and periodically in-
spected its operations, though most of the instructors came from the 
military. 
There were, of course, limitations on the Examination Unit's effec-
tiveness. By the time intercepts from stations around the world reached 
Ottawa, too often the events described had already taken place. Late in 
the war the Unit tried to overcome this handicap by sending liaison of-
ficers to a few of the intercept stations in the hope of speeding up the 
process of distinguishing the significant from the routine. Even then, it 
was only on rare occasions that the Unit could have a message ready 
within three days of its having been sent. There was also the problem of 
deciding which messages merited the laborious task of decyphering and 
decoding by hand when only a small number of them yielded useful in-
formation. In spite of much talk about allied jurisdictions, Canada's ef-
forts were primarily directed toward material being worked on by the 
other two countries. Therefore, the comparative studies produced by the 
Special Intelligence Section regarding Japanese and French diplomatic 
reporting from and to Indo-China, were mainly useful in the event of 
something being previously overlooked. For example, in March 1942, 
from information obtained through the Examination Unit, the Canadian 
legation was instructed to inform Washington that a certain professor 
was seeking a post in a British colony or dominion as a Vichy propagan-
dist. In passing on the information to American intelligence, the Cana-
dians were sure that the messages from which it had been derived would 
not have been decyphered elsewhere. Much to his surprise, Strachey later 
learned that BSC had already passed on the message to the Office of 
Strategic Services in Washington. 
By 1944, the Unit had grown to encompass forty-five staff members 
thanks to the recruiting of classicists and chess players — people who 
could think in cypher — by Glazebrook. Nonetheless, Robinson was 
convinced that, had there been more staff in the Unit, material available 
could have been better exploited. However, this would really have re-
quired a more concerted Canadian effort than was forthcoming. With 
Robertson's support Stone did succeed in having the "Y" Committee ap-
prove (May 1944) his proposal for a more comprehensive policy-making 
body that would join the Y and Examination Unit Committees together. 
While the three service units had gradually come to work with each other 
they continued to answer to different authorities. Stone's proposal was 
aimed at the creation of a single unified body.37 In fact, he thought of it 
as a Canadian equivalent to the British Government Code and Cypher 
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School ("school" was something of a misnomer and it also served as an 
operations centre) at Bletchley Park. The Chiefs of Staff steadfastly re-
jected all efforts at consolidation while the government made it clear that 
it would not run a centre similar to Bletchley Park.38 Stone's posting to 
England in June 1944 deprived the "Y" Committee of its driving force. 
When a special "Y" subcommittee later recommended an amalgamated 
operation under a civilian director, the parent committee failed to ad-
vance the proposal. It was clear that Stone's plans for a major operation 
were stillborn. Before long the armed forces went their separate ways and 
External Affairs was powerless to do anything more on its own.39 Partly 
because of the disintegration of effective "Y" work on Japanese traffic 
and partly because its experienced manpower was needed elsewhere, Ex-
ternal Affairs pulled its Special Intelligence Section out of the Examina-
tion Unit in January 1945.40 
POST-WAR OPÉRATIONS 
On a cost-benefit analysis the usable returns were low, yet they had 
warranted the Examination Unit's continuation throughout the war. 
Canada had come a long way since 1939 when it entered a war without 
the benefit of any intelligence beyond External Affairs reports from its 
few posts abroad and the sanitized information that the British sent out 
to the Dominions.41 As Robertson wrote to Professor Robinson when his 
erstwhile colleague returned to university teaching: "I do not think that 
when we started this work we had any realization that it would be so 
satisfactory and that the returns from it would be as valuable as they 
have been."42 By far the most important aspect of all this activity was 
Canada's move into the arena of diplomacy. At a "Y" Committee 
meeting held on July 6, 1945 (subsequent to the end of the European 
War) it was noted that "In the case of Diplomatic and Commercial 
Coverage, External Affairs should state the countries in which they are 
interested. While External Affairs carries on at present a small amount 
of this type of work—[it] does not intend to increase the scale of opera-
tion for at least 10 to 20 years, due to the very high cost involved."43 
More important at that time seemed to be the role which a secure 
communications network with London and BSC played in keeping 
Robertson and King informed of Vichy's attempts to recruit agents who 
would advance its cause in Quebec, an issue that was vitally important in 
terms of national unity and French-Canadian attitudes toward the war 
effort.44 
It was the link between the Examination Unit and BSC which later 
rescued Canada from a colossal embarrassment when an extensive spy 
ring was revealed by the Soviet embassy defector, Igor Gouzenko.45 Ot-
tawa was dumbfounded in September 1945 by Gouzenko's revelation 
that a Soviet spy-ring operating in Ottawa had knowledge of the atomic 
bomb.46 Seemingly, no one had ever suspected that the Soviet Embassy 
was engaged in anything beyond normal diplomatic activities. There had 
been no trouble, no surveillance, and the Examination Unit had no keys 
to its diplomatic traffic. Yet, Gouzenko identified spies in the State 
Department in Washington, the atomic research laboratories in 
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Montreal, and in External Affairs itself. Emma Woikin, a cypher clerk, 
was writing down, by memory, summaries of an untold number of 
messages to be passed on to a contact. A registry clerk in the British High 
Commission was also passing on information. Were there other spy-rings 
operating in Canada? Gouzenko did not know. With both the British 
and External Affairs communication systems compromised, it seemed 
that arrests would have to be carried out immediately before other possi-
ble collaborators could be identified. Much time would be needed to 
work out the full story, to locate all the contacts and to ensure conceited 
action by the British and Americans who were also involved.47 Fortunate-
ly, there was the secure BSC Unk which prevented the Soviets from 
discovering the immediate consequences resulting from the disclosures, 
thereby providing enough time to ensure that other suspected col-
laborators were identified, not only in Canada but elsewhere. This one 
incident more than justified Canada's expenditures on intelligence 
gathering and communication. 
The Gouzenko episode served to reinforce the arguments against 
dismantling the wartime intelligence gathering operations. It also 
foreshadowed a new war — the Cold War in which entry into Allied in-
telligence networks was vital not only for Canada's security but also for 
its diplomacy. Successful conference diplomacy was dependent upon 
knowing what others knew and were planning. If Canada was to present 
realistic proposals, its diplomats would have to consider the information 
that the Big Powers used in reaching their decisions. Alone it would have 
taken Canada years to acquire such information. Now the country was 
on the inside track. During the golden decade of foreign policy after the 
war, Lester B. Pearson and his colleagues spoke from an authoritative 
base that commanded respect among the allies.48 None of this would 
have been possible had it not been for Canada's contribution to allied in-
telligence gathering during the war and the expertise that this wartime ex-
perience enabled the country to develop. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether Canada used this good beginning to face effectively the 
challenges of the cold war is quite another story which will have to be 
told elsewhere. But, from an intelligence point of view, several lessons 
can be learned from this examination of the emergence of a middle 
power into the mysteries of international diplomacy. 
In the first place it is striking to note how much necessity influences 
intelligence matters. When policy events took place, such as the fall of 
France, then suddenly Canada took on a new geographic and strategic 
significance. The Vichy government's presence in Canada, the disposi-
tion of St. Pierre and Miquelon and the potential scuttling of the French 
fleet at Martinique, were all events which merged allied intelligence needs 
and wherewithal with Canadian resources. These events, along with the 
Canadian response to them, would condition Canada's acceptance into 
that intelligence community. 
Second, it seems to be an axiom of international politics that great 
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men make way for great events. It follows that great intelligence officers 
make things happen. In Canadian intelligence, William Stephenson 
seems to have given the impetus to the Canadian product through BSC, 
Camp X and the connection with External Affairs. Stephenson alone 
would not have been enough and so the role of Norman Robertson 
becomes very important, especially since, besides overseeing the Cana-
dian intelligence scene, Robertson also recruited both Tommy Stone and 
George Glazebrook. Stone was a gifted administrator who worked hard 
to develop a Canadian intelligence establishment. He was succeeded, in 
1944, by Glazebrook whose gift was policy advice and recruitment. 
Nevertheless, both Robertson and Glazebrook resisted the growth of a 
Canadian intelligence service because of the cost. Stone had the vision 
for it but he was shunted off to the Allied Governments in Exile in Great 
Britain in 1944. The British specialist seconded to the Examination Unit, 
Colonel Strachey, was of great benefit to Canada and Herbert Norman 
may have been the country's finest evaluator of intelligence as it pertain-
ed to policy in the Far East. But without ambitious leadership neither 
positive nor negative intelligence could develop as an adjunct to policy-
making. It is believed that Allen Dulles approached Glazebrook in 1946 
or 1947 with a view to urging the creation of a Canadian C.I.A. (In-
terestingly, Kim Philby may even have taken part in the discussions.) 
However, after 1945 no one gave the necessary leadership to the Cana-
dian intelligence community and much ground was lost. 
Third, appropriate organizational response and rationalization of 
disparate military and civilian arms of intelligence must be the catalyst 
for making intelligence meaningful to the policy-maker. There is no 
doubt that BSC had a spill-over effect in creating the Examination Unit. 
The interaction of these last two in turn paved the way for the "Y" Com-
mittee and the Special Intelligence Section. For intelligence to inform 
policy in a meaningful way an intelligence community would have to be 
established. By 194S, Canada was poised to form a full-fledged in-
telligence service and to venture into Cold War decision-making. Unfor-
tunately, in 1945 the armed forces withdrew their intelligence facilities, 
as did External Affairs. Even with the warning sounded by the Gouzenko 
case, the opportunity to develop good, sound, independent intelligence 
estimates was lost. 
Between 1940 and 1945, both circumstances and character con-
tributed to a healthy growth in this neglected area of Canadian foreign 
policy. But it remained for the country's political leadership to determine 
whether intelligence would be systematically gathered in the future or 
whether Canada would remain dependent upon alliance partners. 
Perhaps effective intelligence communities needed the leadership of men 
such as Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt to develop and maintain an im-
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